Mastering Data Management

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Connect the dots before passengers board flights

Is a person who holds a valid US entry visa a cause for concern? No.

Is a person paying cash for a one-way airline ticket suspicious? No.

Is a person taking a transatlantic airplane trip without any luggage suspicious? Not necessarily.

Would knowing a person has been out of contact and likely associated with a radical group be a cause for concern? Probably.

Would knowing a person is barred from entering a foreign country mean that they can’t enter the US? It depends.

Would knowing it is the same person who is on a foreign watch list, associated with a radical terrorist group, holds a valid US visa, paid cash for an international airline flight and checked in with no luggage at the airport be a cause for concern? Definitely.

Such is the case with Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. Abdulmutallab is on a UK watch list and is barred from entering the UK for being denied a visa.

Although he holds a valid US visa, his father told US authorities he believed Abdulmutallab was being radicalized in Yemen. He paid thousands of dollars in cash for a transatlantic plane flight to the US on Christmas Day but checked no luggage at the airport.

When you connect all the dots about Abdulmutallab, it becomes clear that he shouldn’t have been allowed to pass through security and allowed to fly.

Thankfully this near disaster was averted due to a malfunction of Abdulmutallab’s explosive device. In reaction, the Obama administration is calling for a review of the watch list procedures and airport screening technology. The former is the ability to identify persons of interest before they attempt a terrorist attack; the latter is the ability to stop them from bringing an explosive or weapon on a plane.

Stopping a person from carrying a device on a plane is a good thing but is really one of the last lines of defense. Watch list procedures help identify which individuals require extra security screening or even whether an individual should be allowed to make it as far as airport security before being detained.

But Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was on a watch list. He just wasn’t on the right watch list. In other words, his position on a watch list didn’t reflect all of the information known by different countries and programs. What should be under scrutiny, therefore, is how a person gets onto the right watch list.

Make no mistake: accessing and assimilating information like what was known about Abdulmutallab for millions of people is a daunting task. That is the rationale currently put forward by experts and the media as to why Abdulmutallab was not flagged on a watch list - there was not enough information available prior to December 25^th to know Abdulmutallab was a credible threat.

Frankly, that is unacceptable. And if Abdulmutallab would have been successful that excuse would have done nothing to console the families of nearly 300 people on that flight.

The results of the “watch list review” requested by the administration will be interesting. Hopefully there are two things that will come out of it: a thorough discussion of the necessary data, and the notion of a “list.” We’ll discuss these in tomorrow’s post, along with the risks of information sharing and a call for entity resolution.